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The debates about the normativity ofmen-
tal disorders and about the distinction
between somatic and mental disorders
have long been closely linked. This is very
obvious in Szasz, who claims that there can
only be brain disorders, no mental disor-
ders and that so-called mental disorders
are really problems in living. The implica-
tion of the latter claim is that people who
have mental disorders are really people
whose behavior and emotions depart from
societal expectations. One might therefore
be tempted to think that the normativity
claim and the claim that mental disorders
are really brain disorders stand and fall
together. This is indeed what Stier claims.
“Because of the normative nature of psy-
chiatry, mental disorders cannot be com-
pletely reduced to neuronal or molecular
processes.” (Stier, 2013, p.8)
But how close is the link between nor-
mativity and irreducibility really? I agree
with Stier that ascriptions of mental disor-
ders are intrinsically normative, and that
what counts as a mental disorder has to
be decided at the mental rather than at
the brain level is also correct. However, the
normativity claim and the claim that phys-
icalism does not imply that all mental dis-
orders are brain disorders can and should
be separated for two reasons: First, we do
not need the appeal to value judgments to
justify the importance of the mental level
in description and explanation. Second, we
need to invest significant normative judg-
ments in any kind of ascription of disease
or disorder, not just in the range of the
mental.
MENTAL DISORDERS AND BRAIN
DISORDERS
As Schramme (this issue) and others
rightly point out, we cannot do without
the mental level of description because
the decision what counts as dysfunctional
is made at the level of behavior and
mental states. This holds even for dis-
orders which are commonly understood
as brain disorders, such as for example
Alzheimer’s. Alzheimer’s counts as a dis-
order because of the problems with mem-
ory it is associated with. The importance
of the mental level of description secures
its continued relevance: “The claim that
all instances of S have the property of
realizing a disordered neurophysiological
process is only possible at the psycho-
logical level of explanation” (Schramme,
2013, p. 5). It is therefore conceivable
that we might end up being able to iden-
tify the physiological correlates of vari-
ous mental disorders while still classifying
these as mental disorders, as what marks
these conditions and their corresponding
brain states as disordered is a psychological
defect.
One might think that the fact that men-
tal disorders are physically based implies
that mental disorders are ipso facto brain
disorders and that what counts as a brain
disorder becomes dependent on what
counts as a mental disorder. In this way,
the close link between mental disorders
and brain disorders would be retained,
but the concept of brain disorder would
become dependent on that of mental dis-
order. But this inference is not licensed.
It presupposes that there cannot be sepa-
rate criteria for what counts as malfunc-
tion in the brain and what counts as a
malfunction in the mind and that pat-
terns of dysfunction can be pursued all
the way down. However, this is by no
means conceptually necessary. As has been
pointed out in the literature, physicalism
does not entail that where there is men-
tal dysfunction, there is always a physi-
cal dysfunction. The computer analogy is
sometimes invoked to illustrate the point
that just as software problems do not
imply hardware problems mental prob-
lems do not necessarily imply corre-
sponding physical problems. As Boorse
puts it “Whether and how a computer
program, or a mental state, is dysfunc-
tional need not be evident from any
of its physical properties” (Boorse, 1976,
p. 68).
This is not to say that there cannot
be a close link between what is labeled
as psychological dysfunction and what
gets specified as brain dysfunction. While
there are some clear cases of brain prob-
lems such as lesions which are specifi-
able without reference to the mental level,
some of our conceptions of brain dys-
function are derived from the psycholog-
ical level, rather than from independent
conceptions of what counts as a brain
malfunction. An example for this is the
fact that the anomalies in the function-
ing of the amygdala found in psychopaths
are labeled as dysfunctions because of the
mental and emotional impairments they
are associated with.
To summarize, whether dysfunction at
the mental level is best described as dys-
function at the brain level is an empir-
ical issue and it is by no means clear
that very strong correlations can always
be established. It may well be that in
some cases, the way a certain disorder
is realized in the brain is so disparate
that no explanatory value is achieved by
labeling the mental disorder in question
as a brain disorder. Whether something
should count as a brain disorder or a
mental disorder will depend not on con-
siderations regarding physicalism and the
ultimate nature of the mind-brain rela-
tion but on what is explanatorily primary,
the level of the mental or that of the
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physical. This is not a new thought, and
it has been forcefully argued for in the
context of the autonomy of the special
sciences (cf. Fodor, 1974). But it is worth-
while reminding people that diagnoses
of mental and brain disorders cannot
simply be inferred from our ontological
commitments but serve the purpose of
explaining and treating these disorders.
The importance of the first point has been
stressed by Schramme and Stier, I hope
to have helped shed some light on the
latter.
NORMATIVITY
I now want to turn to the normativ-
ity of mental disorders, a point Stier is
particularly focused on. What he has in
mind is not merely that all conceptions
of disorder are at least minimally norma-
tive because they make reference to such
notions as dysfunction and “correct func-
tioning.” Rather, Stier endorses what he
calls the stronger claim that psychiatry
is guided by social, moral, cultural and
other norms. That psychiatry is de facto
a value laden discipline and that psychi-
atric diagnoses are to an extent dependent
on the values that practitioners in the field
and the surrounding society endorse is
undeniable. I take it that Stier does not
merely intend this as a true but fairly
innocuous description of psychiatric prac-
tice. Rather, to have any philosophical bite,
the claim must be that this is an essen-
tial feature of psychiatry which cannot be
given up (see Rüther’s comment in this
issue).
One might think that subjectivity in
norms is unproblematic if there are
no objective values in the first place.
According to this line of thought, a subjec-
tive or culturally relative diagnosis could
only be wrong if there was an objective
standard against which it could be mea-
sured as wrong. If this is not the case,
then there is nothing troublesome in the
difference of values which lead to differ-
ent conceptualizations and classifications
of disorder. However, I do not believe that
a strongly relativist perspective is inter-
nally coherent. It would assume that the
cultural relativist would have to concede
that what is a disorder in their own society
is not in another. For example, a homo-
sexual would change from being disor-
dered to being healthy simply by moving
from a culture where homosexuality is
seen as a mental disorder to one where it
is not. But it does not seem credible to me
that anyone would actually concede this
degree of relativity for their own ascrip-
tions of disorderedness. A certain amount
of vagueness is of course unavoidable, but
when we ascribe mental disorders, we try
to get it right and worry that we may
end up wrongly labeling something as a
disorder.
The knowledge that ascriptions of men-
tal disorder are in fact often culturally
biased is troublesome because diagnosing
someone with a mental disorder has far
reaching practical consequences. If peo-
ple can be sectioned because of acute
mental disturbance, we do not want deci-
sions as to what constitutes mental distur-
bance to be culturally arbitrary. Otherwise,
social deviance could be labeled as men-
tal disorder and used as a way of stig-
matizing or discrediting people, or even
withdrawing their personal freedom. For
all of its weaknesses, the general defi-
nition of mental disorders in the DSM
tries to address this issue, stating that
“Socially deviant behavior (e.g., politi-
cal, religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that
are primarily between the individual and
society are mental disorders unless the
deviance or conflict results from a dys-
function in the individual, as described
above”(American Psychiatric Association,
2013, p.20). Unfortunately, this does not
really solve the problem, as it brings us
back to the question what a dysfunction
is. There needs to be a standard accord-
ing to which we judge whether calling
a certain condition pathological is valid
or not.
The consequence some writers, in
particular Christopher Boorse, have
drawn from this is that we need to
purge psychiatry of values and endorse
a scientific notion of disease, whereby
any residual normativity can be explained
in biological terms. He proposes that we
can define disease in terms of dysfunc-
tion and dysfunction in terms of deviation
from normal species-typical function-
ing. Normal functioning is described as
typical contribution to survival and repro-
duction. The problem with this type of
account is that it only seemingly avoids
normativity. Unless it is a purely statistical
notion, talk of dysfunction presupposes
that there is something the mind or body
should be doing, not merely something
it normally does. A statistical notion of
dysfunction and pathology is too thin
to be useful for medical practice. This
does not mean that it cannot be extremely
useful in describing various conditions.
But arguably, the move from describing
something as anomalous to describ-
ing it as a dysfunction always requires
a commitment as to how something is
supposed to function which goes beyond
observations on what is statistically
normal.
Fortunately, we need not assume that
being evaluative and being objective are
mutually exclusive unless we are given
a convincing argument to the contrary.
Rather, we can look for some specification
of harms ensuing from anomalous men-
tal conditions which we can use to justify
that a certain condition is indeed a mental
disorder. An example for such an attempt
is Gert and Culver’s proposal for a defini-
tion of mental disorder drawing on the list
of harms given in the DSM IV TR. They
point out that the list only contains states
considered to be harms cross-culturally,
such that there is an objective, broadly
shared notion of harm. “The agreement of
rational persons in all societies about the
universality of the basic harms is extremely
important, for it establishes the objectiv-
ity of the concept of a disorder” (Gert and
Culver, 2004, 421f.). It should be pointed
out that, just as de facto disagreement and
subjectivity does not automatically entail
the subjectivity of all value, neither does
de facto agreement automatically estab-
lish objectivity. Nevertheless, a theory of
value does well to take the things people
actually value and agree on as a starting
point.
In conclusion, ascriptions of dis-
order are normative, but we should
strive for objectivity in our evalua-
tions. Furthermore, there is no need
to fear that advances in the brain sci-
ences will make the level of the mental
redundant.
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